Abstract: A novel physical layer secret key generation technique for point-to-point optical fiber link security is proposed. It can efficiently generate high entropy symmetric cryptographic keys based on Polarization Mode Dispersion in optical fiber links.
Method overview
The proposed physical layer secret generation method is based on the changes of PMD in the long optical fiber. PMD is a random effect since it relies on the details of the instantaneous weak birefringence state of the fiber link. Over time, the PMD varies with physical parameters such as temperature, pressure, external and internal stress etc. However, depending on the data rate in a normal telecommunication link with a state-of-the-art SMF-28 with PMD coefficient of 0.04 / ps km , the PMD effect manifests itself beyond 2000km. To mimic the effect of the PMD in a long haul communication link in a small PPOL, (Fig. 1) we incorporate two pieces of Randomly Spliced Polarization Maintained fibers (RSPMF) at both transceiver ends. The proposed system works in two modes i.e. communication mode and key generation mode. The switching time between these two modes is below a half millisecond due to the use of fast opto-mechanical MEMS switches. As a result, during the key-generation mode, the Differential Group Delay (DGD) between two Principal States of Polarization (PSP) will be higher and stochastic due to the long SMF-28 fibers in between transceivers and SMF pigtails. This approach facilitates the key generation technique and Fig. 1 . Proposed Key Generation Scheme increases the entropy of the keys. To assess the feasibility of our proposed system, we develop a model of the communication link with two transceivers, Alice and Bob. When Alice and Bob want to generate a symmetric key, they need to exchange a pre-defined probe signal (PRBS modulated bit pattern with a predefined length). During the key generation mode, this signal will go through a high PMD effect due to the randomly spliced PMF segments. This can be described as the data path of (a-b-c-d-e) in Fig. 1 . The changes in the Differential Group Delay (DGD) in a long fiber is entirely stochastic and follows a Maxwell probability distribution as given in equation 1 [5] , where ∆ , , q 2 are the average DGD, fiber length and the variance of the Maxwell distribution, respectively .
`
Owing to the orthogonality of the input principle state of the polarization (PSP), any input polarization can be written as a vector sum of its components. The output electric field vector in the time domain will look like: represents the DGD. DGD will result in random complex modulation of the probe signal. For our simulation, we followed the famous discrete wave plate model and Jones matrix calculation [6, 7] . If we ignore the polarization dependent loss, the frequency dependent Jones matrix for any wave plate can be represented by equation 3, where () S  denotes the rotation of the fast axis of the wave plate by  degree from +x axis, L is the fiber length, nfast and nslow are the refractive indices for fast and slow mode respectively.
For a high speed (>10Gbps) transmission system, the data transmission rate is higher than the rate of change of average DGD [8] . For this reason, we approximate the communication channel response as constant during the probe signal propagation. In our simulation, we found that there is high reciprocity of the modulated probe signal (> .85 Pearson correlation coefficient between Alice and Bob's signals), and there is also high randomness (approx. > 12 bits of Shannon entropy for each group of samples). Conventionally, Eve does not have direct access to the transceiver systems, but may have access to a point along the communication link as shown in Fig.1 . As a result, Eve will not be able to observe the randomly spliced PMF, the probe signal, or input polarization state of the signal. Moreover, even if we assume Eve has information about these systems or features, Eve will not be able to generate the same keys as Alice and Bob due to the stochastic nature of the PMD. As a result, Eve will not be able to eavesdrop on the encrypted channel. After the key establishment agreement between Alice and Bob, the system will go into communication mode and send signals via the p-b-c-d-q path just as in a conventional point-to-point optical fiber link.
In our key generation technique, each transceiver will take a set of samples from the pre-defined probe signal (PRBS) and quantize their signal strengths (in Amps) into symmetric key bits. Each transceiver will compute upper (Thrupper) and lower (Thrlower) thresholds of a group of samples, SampleGroup, with group size (g), based on their mean and variation [4, 9] else do not quantize. In the case of potential mismatching key bits, we include an index mismatch removal step, which takes the indices of the values selected for quantization and removes the mismatching ones. More specifically, during the sampling step, both Alice and Bob store the index of each value they selected into their private lists, IndicesAlice and IndicesBob. Then they exchange and remove mismatching indices in their respective lists. The result will be matching sets of indices to be used for generating the symmetric keys. Since this step involves no sharing of information about the actual signal strength values or the actual bits, Eve will not gain valuable information about the symmetric keys. After the algorithm meets the required key size, the resulting key will be tested and used for encrypting future messages.
Simulation results and model verification
Signal propagation through the system is modeled by a combination of commercial simulation tools including VPI transmission Maker and Matlab. In particular, we used VPI transmission Maker to generate the PRBS, to create the modulated NRZ optical signal, to detect the signal at the detector and to include all the noises like Relative Intensity Noise (RIN), shot noise, thermal noise etc. The propagation of the optical signal in both directions, the reciprocity check, entropy estimation, and the key generation algorithm are all implemented in MATLAB based on the split-step method. We performed simulations according to different bit rates (40Gb/s, 60Gb/s) and different link lengths to check the reciprocity and entropy of the modulated signal due to high PMD. Fig.2 shows the randomly modulated signal received by Alice and Bob at 60Gb/s. Corresponding threshold levels to generate keys are also shown in Fig. 2 . The generated keys for different link lengths and data communication rate are showed in Fig.3 . To minimize the simulation times, we used a 2 7 -1 PRBS and 256 bits to emulate data propagation. Calculations are performed for 50km and 60km links to generate up to 128-bit secret keys. Results show that symmetric secret keys can be generated with little or no bit mismatch rates (0-3.6% when generating 200-500 secret key bits according to different g and α values). By using the same approach with longer PRBS streams, it is also possible to generate >256-bit secret keys, if necessary.
Conclusion
We proposed and simulated a novel key generation scheme which can be incorporated in any existing PPOL to establish secret keys for symmetric encryption. We showed that the PMD effect can be exploited as a source of physical randomness to generate high entropy symmetric secret keys. With our proposed system, we successfully generated 32, 64 and 128 bit-keys.
